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The Effects of Exitability by the Alternative Negotiation on the Electronic Negotiation
: Content Analysis of Negotiation Behavior
HATTA T^KETOSⅢ (八田武俊) I and OHBUCHI KEN-IClll (大渕憲一) 1
( Tohoku UniueJSity)
We exalrlined the i皿uences ｡fexitabiliLy by inducillg the altemative negotiation parlller irl electronic
negotiation on the pemept.on of anxiety for continuation, assertive and constmtive verbal actions, and
negotiation outcome･ In a ro一e-play experiment･ 40 students negotiate,d with each other through the cTnail
system in orle Oftwo experimental conditions･ Tt wa誼,und tllat pa止cIPantS in the exitable conditiorl Were
motivated to keep the otller pany ln Cunent negOtiatiorl and made less assenlng and compromising
behaViors than those in the l】neXitable c0-1dition･ Further言t was indicated that participants ill the exitable
cor-dition reaclled agrcemellt mOr誼equendy than山se il- the uneXitable condition a血l the agre(-erlt
was more integrative in tile eXitable conditioll than in he llrleXilable c｡IlditioTl.
Key words‥ eleclro,-ic IICgOtiation, exitahility, conte'-t analysIS
Introduction
Recently, remote tele-communication technology'such as e-mail, fax, or phones, has
become essentia皿,I intemational business negotiations between companies (Moore, Kunzberg,
Thompson, & MoHis, 1999)･ For example言t is reponed that approximately 80% of business
organizations use Computer-Mediated-Communication (CMC) as an impo血nt way to
communicate for daily duties (Overtly, 1999)I This is based on the usefulness in negotiation and
exchanging infb-ation within the members of an organization (Kiesler 皮 Sproul, 1992).
There is research suggestlng a negative aspect of CMC that an inhibition against negative
emotions and behaviors is reduced by lack of nonverbal cues (Sieges, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, 皮
McGuire, 1986i Camevale a Probst. 1996)I It has generated a skelnical view of electronic
negotiation (e･gつMorris, Nadler, Kenzberg, 皮 Thompson, 2002; Purdy, Nye, & Balakrishnan,
2000; Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995)･ However, some researchers have fbcused on positive e胱cts
of CMC on the processes and consequencies of neg｡tiation･ Hatta, Ohbuchi, and Fukuno (2003)
found that exitability in CMC prompts particIPantS tO Offer a low level of demand and therefore
to reach agreement in electronic negotiation･ This finding suggests that electronic media make
negotiations constructive and smooth･ Exitability of the other party lS a PSyChologlcal factor that
causes one to perceive a negotiation as uncemin and unstable･ The purpose of the present study
was to examine the e的cts of exitability on verbal behaviors of paniclpantS in electronic
negotiations･
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Electronic media is characterized by an asynchrony ln COmmunication such that users send
or receive messages at d鵬rent places and times (e･g･, Sproull & Kiesler, 1991; Wheeler, 1995).
A physical distance (proximity) determines communication between people. Manipulating visual
anonymlty and proximlty between pa誼clpantS in electronic negotiation, Hatta and Ohbuchi
(2004) found that physical distance induced participants to exit Hom the negotiation to change
panners because they perceived mat the norm of continuation is not salient and the possibility of
being retaliated is Iow〟 So言n electronic negotiation, the pany can easily exit五〇m the negotiation.
Hatta et al (2003) also suggested that the existence of altemative 曹anners increased exitability. In
the present study,血erefbre, We attempted to manipulate the perceived exitability by introducing
alternative panners to negotiate with･ We hypothesized that paniclpant Who perceived exitability
of the other pa叫by the altemative negotiation would be more strongly motivated to reduce
anxiety仕,I me cunent negotiation 血an the paniclpant Who did not perceive it･
Manipulating the perceived exitahility by an instruction, Hatta and Ohbuchi (2003) found
that the partlCIPantS Who thought the other pany might exit made less assertive actions and more
血equently reached agreements than those who did not think so･ Inconsistent with the authors '
expectations, however, the perceived exitability did not inHuence compromise･ They Interpreted
that the pa止clpantS did not want to take one-sided concessions that would hamper selがinterests
even if they鮒t low power by the perception Of exitability of the opponent･ Negotiators may avoid
such a strate執T if possible･ Theyrmay be willing to compromise only ln exchange fbr the other
paHy 's compromise･ Therefbre, We hypothesized that paniclpantS Who perceived exitability
would be more strongly motivated to reduce anxiety for the continuation (Hypothesis 1), and
would assert their demand to a lesser extent (Hypothesis2) and would more frequently
compromise (Hypothesis 3) when they perceived the other pally Was eXitable than when they did
not･ Assumlng that these collaborative behaviors mayぬcilitate integrative a訂eementS, We mnher
hypothesized that the pa誼clpantS Who perceived the other pany was exitable would more
hequently reach integrative agreements than those who did not perceive it (HJPOthesis 4).
Method
PartlCIPantS
The participants were 40 Japanese university students (20 males and 20 females) and they
were randomly paired to paniclpate in the electronic media negotiation task･ Unacquainted palls
were chosen･ A丑er me experiment, each pa誼clpant Was given a book coupon of 500 yen as a
reward.
Procedures
When two pa血clpantS arrived at the laboratoIy㍉he experimenter told them that they would
negotiate with students血om another university (actually, both pa克es were in d鵬rent booths in
the laboratory) 〟 In order to motivate the paHicipants to negotiate占he experimenter gave them me
請lowlng Instructions: the goal of each pa誼cIPant Was tO maximize his or her personal scores占he
pa止clpant Who obtained the highest scores in each condition would be given an additional 3000
yen as a bonus; but言f a pair did not reach agreement within a time limit, the scores of bom
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pamclpantS would be zero･ A請er explainlng that this is a negotiation on laboring conditions
between employee and employer, the experimenter randomly asslgned me pa止cIPantS tO One Of
mese roles･ Then, me experimenter took the panicIPantS tO Separated booths, and asked them to
negotiate with each other via computer, explainlng how to use chat so血ware･
The negotiation staned with the employee 's action･ The employee produced a message
uslng a WOrd-Processor on hisl her display of the computer, and helshe clicked a button labeled
/〟``Deliver" when me message was completed･ Then, me message was displayed on the employer's
ll
display, being accompanied with a slgn ``Your tum, promptlng himlher to produce a message
in response to the employee･ When the employer clicked the "Deliver''button言n tum, hislher
message was sent to he employee's computer･ In this manner, both pa克es continued to
exchange their messages until they reached an agreement or the time expired (45 minutes) ･ When
40 min had passed, the experimenter infb-ed the pa誼cIPantS that 5 minutes remained･ A血er me
negotiation, the pa誼clpantS Were asked to respond to questions to measure anxiety fbr the
contlnuatlOn.
Negotiatiort task
The task used in this experiment was a mod誼cation of the paradigm used by Fukuno and
Ohbuchi (1997)･ Each panicipant was presented with a payo∬ schedJe fbr hislher role, which
indicated the issues to be resolved and me gain helshe would get fbr each of possible alternatives
for each issue･ The payoH schedule consisted of four issues (e･g･, wage per hour. transportation
expenses, training period, and working-time per month) and the gain for each of nine possible
altematives for each issue (Table 1)･ Among the issues, wage per hour was distributive,
血ansponation expenses and trainlng period were integrative, that is, logroHing was possible, and
working-time per month was compatible･ The distributive issue was a completely厳ed-sum (i･e･,
Table 1 Profit schedules for employee and employer
Employee
Issues ?
Wageper 膝&?7?'F?柳薑&?譁誡?orking-time 
hour 剖?V?WFW&ﾒ?month 
1050(600) 涛?ツ?尾F?2?#??5days(440) 
1000(525) 塔?ゴ迭?F?2???22days(385) 
950(450) 都?ゴ?擢F?2?C??9days(330) 
900(375) 田?イ#R坊F?2???ledays(275) 
850(300) 鉄??C???2?c??3days(220) 
800(225) 鼎??SR???2?#??0days(165) 
750(150) ???s??F?2ャ??days(110) 
700(75) ??ャR?FF?2イ??days(55) 
650(0) ????fF?2??ldays(0) 
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Employee
Issues ?
Wageper 膝&?7?'F?柳薑&?譁誡?orking-time 
hour 剖?V?WFW&ﾒ?month 
1650(0) 涛??尾F?2??25days(440) 
1000(75) 塔?イ?&F?2ャR?22days(385) 
950(150) 都?ャ?FF?2?s??9days(330) 
900(225) 田??#?VF?2?SR?16days(275) 
850(300) 鉄??c???2?C??3days(220) 
800(375) 鼎??????2イ#R?10days(165) 
750(450) ???C??F?2ゴ??7days(110) 
1700(525) ?????FF?2ゴ迭?I 4days(55) 
650(600) ????#??F?2ツ??1days(0) 
Each issue consists of 9 alternatives and簡糾reS in parentheses are the scores each pa血,parlt gal一-5･
gains Sol one resulted in the equal degree of losses for the other pally)i the logrolling issues were
a variable-sum depending on combinations of the altematives of me two issues (i.e., gains f♭r one
ロany did not result in the equal degree of losses fbr the other); and言n the compatible issue, the
value of each alternative was the same fb∫ bom negotiators (i･e･, a gain fbr one pany resulted in
an equal gain fbr the other)i The experimenter stressed that the panicipants must continue the
negotiation until they reached agreement on all of the fbur issues or the time expired･
IndependeTtt Uariables
The experiment consisted of 2 levels of exitability, which d鵬red in the availability of
alternative negotiation partners, and the palrS Of particIPantS Were randomly asslgned into one of
the two conditions･ In the exitable condition, the experimenter separately told each pa止clpallt
that the other pa叫was allowed to exit the negotiation and to change paHner at any tlme. In the
unexitable condition, the experimenter insmcted the pa血clpantS mat both panies were not
allowed to exit the negotiation until the agreement･ In both the exitable and unexitable conditions,
the negotiation ended when an agreement was glVen by a paHy 's acceptance of the o胱r provided
by the other pany･
DepeTtderit Uariables
Ohbuchi, Chiba, and Fukushima (1997) developed me scoring system的r the content
analysュs Of verbal responses in conHict situations･ Among the 14 response categories measured by
this system (rejection, asse証on, demand, threat, explanation, supplication, suggestion,
persuasion, question, Compromise, consideration, acceptance, trade-off, and tap), we focused on
two collaborative actions (血ade-o∬ and compromise) and three asse止ve actions (asse誼on,
demand, and threat)〟 Compromise was to make concessions声rade一〇∬ was to make concessions
on an issue combined with making demands on another issue; assenion was to argue that one 'S
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o鵬r was reasonable; demand was to ar糾e that one's o鵬r was not negotiable; and threat was
to suggest a breakdown in negotiation when the other ロany did not accept one 's o胱r･ Three
raters independendy co°ed each message according to these categories, and scored什equencies
of each of the 14 categories fbr each paniclpant･ The血equency score of each category was
convened into a percentage fbr the tota皿equency of 1 4 categories in each paniclpant, and then,
it was averaged between the three raters･ Rehability coefficients ( a ) were ･88 for compromise,
--〟
･89 for trade-off, ･86 for assertion, ･87 for demand, and ･00 for threat･ Only a later used the
category "threat" for only a message of a particIPant, hut the other raters did not use it at al上
Besides these individual scores, the palr Scores Were also glVen by aggregatlng the illdividual
scores of two pa止clpantS in each palr･
The measure of agreement was the number of palls in each condition that agreed on all of
the four issues within 40 minutes in the negotiation session･ The reason was that an agreement
reached a範r 40 minutes was not regarded as voluntary but as pressed by the experimenter's
announcement that 5 minutes remained in the allotted period･ The measure of integrativeness was
the jolnt galn, that is, the total scores of the paired pa血clpantS Who reached agreement within 45
mlnuteS.
1n order to measure the anxiety fbr the continuation of negotiatiom each pa止clpant Was
asked a範r me experiment to answer血e question, "Did you make e的ns to hold the other pa叶
in the current negotiation?" on a 7-point scale ranging from "Not at all (1)" to "Defm'tely (7)".
Results
Irdiuidual artalysis
Anm'etyfor the continuation ofnegotiation･ The item scores were tested by ANOm using
exitability as independent variable･ The e胱ct of exitability was marginally sign誼cant, F(1 ,39) -
3･95, p - ･054･ This non-slgn請cant e範ct suggests that the paniclpantS in the exitable condition
鮒t stronger anxiety fbr the continuation of negotiation than those in the unexitable condition
(〟 - 5.35 vs. 4.50).
Negotiation behauiors. Table 2 shows the means of the individual scores of the four verbal
response categories in each colldition･ These scores were tested by M4NOVA uslng eXitability as
an independent variable･ The e鵬ct of exitability on asse五〇n was signmcant, F(1,39) - 5･80,
p < ･05, and that on compromise and demand were marginally sign誼cant, ド(1,39) - 3･77,
p - ･06 and F(1,39) - 3･65, p - ･064･ The panicipants in the exitable condition made less
Table 2　Means and SDs of the individual scores of assertioll, demand, Compromise, trade一｡航s a Function of exitability
Assertion Demand Compromise Trade-off
Condition M SD M SD M SD M SD
Exitable 0.002　　0.009　　0.065　　0.129　　0.009　　0.031　0.237　　0.183
Unexitable 0.099　　0.179　　0.151　0.154　　0.067　　0.131　0.170　　0,1 64
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assenion, Compromise, and demanding actions man those in the unexitable condition･
Pair Analysis
Negotiation behwiors･ Table 3 shows the means of the pa.r scores of the four verbal
response categories in each condition･ These scores were tested by M4NOVA uslng eXitability as
an independent variable･ The e鵬ct of exitability on assenion was sign苗cant, F(1,19) - 6･14,
p < ･05, and those on demand and corTPrOmise were marginally signiflCant言F(1,19) - 6･74･
p -.063; F(1,19) - 4･37, p - ･051･ The pa誼cipants in the exitable condition made less
asse証on, Compromise, and demanding actions than those in the unexitable condition･
Table 3　Means and SDs or the pair scores of asse五〇m, demand, Compromise再ade-o鯖as a Function of exitability
Assertion D e血and Compromise Trade-off
Condition M SD M SD M SD M SD
Exitable 0.002　　0.007　　0.065　　0.080　　0.009　　0.01 4　　0.238　　0.1 49
Unexitable 0.103　　0.129　　0.152　　0.113　　0.064　　0.082　　0.164　　0.123
Agreement･ Fi糾re 1 shows the number of palls that reached an a伊eement in each
condition. In order to test the di胱rences between the experimental conditions, we conducted a
chi square test. It t revealed that the palls in the exitable condition reached agreement more
血equently than those in the unexitable condition, chi square (1) - 3･53, p - ･06･
JmuOaJScJoJaqunN
8　　　6
4　　　2　　　0
Exitable Unexitable
Condition Condition
ngure l･ Frequency of agreement
Joint galriS･ Joint game Were the total scores of the particIPantS in each pall Who reached
an agreement within 45 minutes･ These scores were tested by ANO班uslng eXitability as an
independent variable･ The e鮎ct of exitability was si伊Ii鯖cant, F(1 ,13) - 7･97, p < ･05･ The joint
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galれ Of the pall in the exitable condition was slgnmcantly higher than those in the unexitable
condition (M - 2683, 2414)〟
Correlation a,taIysis･ In order to examine the relationships between negotiation behaviors,
agreements, and joint galnS, We COmputed conelations between the variables･ Table 4 indicates
that demand signi丘candy comelated positively with asse止on, and血ese slgni鯖candy conelated
negatively with the jolnt galn･
Table 4　Correlations between the dependent variables
Deperld Measures
3　　　　　　4　　　　　　5
1. Assenion
2. Demand
3･ Compromise
4. Trade-o∬
5･ Agreement
6. Joint galれ
伊　4　2　9　年5　　3　　3　　イ1　　7
8　9　7　銅3　　3　　1⊥　　7
5　　2　　イ11　　1　　3
0ノ　　0
0　　′4"
-.42
*p<･05･橡p<･01
Discussion
In the present study, we focused on exitability, which is a social psychologlCal characteristic
of elec血onic media negotiation･ Through a laboratoIY experiment, We attempted to examine a
series of hypotheses regarding the e範cts of exitability on the processes and outcomes of electronic
negotiation･
We hypothesized that the pamclpantS Who perceived the other pa巾y was exitable would
decrease assertive behaviors (Hypothesis 2) and increase collaborative behaviors (Hypothesis 3)
because they were motivated to reduce anxiety For the continuation of negotiation (Hypothesis 1) I
To examine the prediction, we obse…ed the behavior of the paniclpantS in the exitable condition,
in which mey were told mat the other pany could exit hom the negotiation, and in the unexitable
condition, m Which hey were told mat both panies could not exit･ The results were consistent with
Hypothesis 1 and 2, that is, the particIPantS in the exitable condition were motivated to keep the
omer pany ln Cunent negotiation, and made less assemng and demanding behaviors than those
in the unexitable condition･ This suggests that the pa止clpantS Who perceived the other pany
potentially had altemative negotiation ロanners avoided engaglng ln Selrassemng behavior with
an expectation to keep the other pany ln the cument negotiation･
It was also fbund that the pa止clpantS in the exitable condition made less compromlSlng
behavior than those in the unexitable condition, Inconsistent with HJPOthesis 3･ It was suggested
that the participants did not make mere concessions even when they felt anxiety for continuation
of negotiation･ Hatta and Ohbuchi (2003) suggested that participants did not prefer such a
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one-sided concession even when they were in a low-power status, and the results of he present
study suppohed their suggestion･ Exitability did I10t e胱ct trade一〇∬ behavior, though the
particIPantS in the exitable condition made this type of behavior non-slgnif.cantly more oHen than
hose in the unexitable condition (M - 0･237 vs･ 0･170)･ Although the results were inconsistent
with Hypothesis 3, the pattern of means was consistent with our prediction･ Some of the
pa止clpantS Who perceived that the other pa叩COuld exit什om the negotiation attempted to
trade一〇任instead of selrasse血on and mere compromise･
To examine the e耽cts of exitability on negotiation outcomes, we analyzed the rates of
agreement･ The rest.Its were consistent with Hypothesis 4, that is, the particIPantS in the exitahle
condition reached agreement more血equently than those in the unexitable condition and the
agreement was more integrative in the exitable condition than in the unexitahle condition･ In the
exitable condition, the pa五clpantS behaved.len-aSSe止vely･ Such a cooperative orientation seems
to have prompted agreements･ In addition, the鰭ct that me integrative agreement was made in
the exitahle condition suggests that the particIPantS attempted to share prof.ts for both parties
I
through negotiations･ These results indicate that the perceptlOn that the other pa叫has altemative
negotiation 曹anners prompted integrative a伊eementS･ Pinkley and his collea糾eS (Pinkley, Neale,
& Rennet, 1994; Pinkley, 1995) demonstrated that pamicipants who do not have alternative
negotiation 曹anners tend to o鵬r more attractive proposals and are more strongly committed to
the current negotiation than those having them, probably with anxiety for continuation of
negotiation･ Using the electronic negotiation situation, we obseⅣed the same positive e鵬cts of
alternative paHners as Pinkley et al'S･ Therefbre, the exitability can be regarded as a positive
characteristic of electronic negotiation that provides paniclpantS With alternative 曹anners and
distance.
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